The Lack of Protection Afforded Software under the Current Intellectual Property Laws by Amin, Himanshu S.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1995
The Lack of Protection Afforded Software under
the Current Intellectual Property Laws
Himanshu S. Amin
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Computer Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Himanshu S. Amin, The Lack of Protection Afforded Software under the Current Intellectual Property Laws, 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 19 (1995)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss1/7
THE LACK OF PROTECTION AFFORDED SOFTWARE
UNDER THE CURRENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS1
I. INTRODUCTION ......................
A. Software Piracy .................
II. SOFTWARE BASICS ....................
A. Transistors .....................
B. Source and Object Code ...........
III. METHODS OF PROTECTINc SOFTWARE ......
A . Patents ........................
B. Copyrights .....................
C. Trade Secrets ...................
............... 19
............... 19
............... 20
............... 20
............... 21
............... 21
............... 22
............... 30
............... 38
IV. INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF PROTECTION ....
V. CONCLUSION ....................................
..38
. .40
I. INTRODUCTION
Many abstract advances in computer technology remain unprotected since
the current intellectual property system has been shaped through a focus on
tangible, physical inventions.2 The software industry in the United States
"accounts for domestic revenues of over fifty billion dollars each year in
worldwide sales and services."3 Accordingly, it is imperative that United States
software developers be provided adequate intellectual property coverage in
order to protect existing technology and encourage further innovation in the
field. The present lack of adequate protection has handicapped American
developers unnecessarily in the global software market.4
A. Software Piracy
As described by some commentators, "Software piracy in the [United States]
has reached epidemic portions. For every legitimate copy of a commercially
1This paper won the 1994 Nathan Burkan award for Best Paper in Copyright Law
at Case Western Reserve University. All rights reserved. Copyright 1994 by Himanshu
S. Amin.
2See generally Note, Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1046 (1990); see, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47
U. PIrT. L. REV. 959 (1986) (advocating greater patent protection for algorithms).
3 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS COMPUTER SOFIWARE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: BACKGROUND PAPER 1, 5 (1990).
4 See John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection for Computer
Software, 60 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 997, 1001 (1992).
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successful program at least four, and according to some estimates ten or more,
pirated copies exist."5 Unauthorized copying of software by private and
corporate consumers has resulted in the software industry losing over a billion
dollars annually in the United States alone. In addition to the billions lost
annually as a result of domestic piracy, international piracy costs the software
industry between $8 billion and $10 billion each year in lost revenues. 6 Software
publishers are thus deprived of revenues that could be used to develop new
products and support existing software.7 "At present, software development
may account for fifty to ninety percent of the total development costs of a
typical industrial or scientific system...." 8 Piracy also makes it difficult for new
software publishers to attract venture capital. "This lack of money for research
and development could weaken the software industry--an industry in which
the constantly advancing state of the art makes financial support for innovation
essential."9
II. SOFTWARE BASICS
For the reader to understand the issues discussed in this paper, it is necessary
to explain a few basic concepts relating to the technology behind computer
software.
A. Transistors
A personal computer's microprocessor is a complex collection of thousands
or even millions of microscopic transistors which serve as on/off switches. The
transistors are laid out in a microchip along circuits made up of superfine traces
of aluminum. When the transistors are arranged in certain patterns, parts of
the microprocessors are designated to hold data while others are used to
manipulate that data.10
The on/off switches of the transistors lend themselves handily to
representing binary numbers. Data and software codes are stored in the form
of binary numbers. In the binary system, two digits-0 and 1-represent all
5 See Michael B. Einschlag & Peter L. Michaelson, Patent and Trade Secret Protection
of Software: Patentability Programs-Nature and Scope of Trade Secret Protection, at 403 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No.
G4-3791, 1986), available in WESTLAW, 225 PLI/Pat 403.
6 See Ilene Rosenthal, Software Piracy Is A Bigger Problem Than You May Realize, C848
ALI-ABA 323, Apr. 15,1993, at 325.
7 See Julie A. Mark, Software Copying Policies: The Next Step in Piracy Prevention, 2 J.L.
& TECH. 43 (1987) (research indicates that publishers now devote from 5% to 10% of
their revenues to research and development).
8Phillips, supra note 4, at 1001 (citing BARRY W. BOEHM, SOFTWARE ENGNEERING
EcoNoMics 18 (1981)).
9 BOEHM, supra note 8, at 18.
10 See RON WHITE, How SOFTWARE WoRKs 5 (1993).
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numbers. A transistor that is turned off represents a 0; a transistor that is turned
on represents a 1. Each single 0 or 1 is referred to as a bit; eight bits make up a
byte, and 1,024 bytes make up a kilobyte (K). 11
B. Source and Object Code
Computer programs most often exist in two forms: source code and object
code. Source code is the language in which software is actually written by the
programmer,12 it is a high-level form of language which resembles our spoken
language.13 Source code is programming language that is intelligible to
humans, and it is comprised mainly of descriptive key words and common
mathematical notations. 14 Source code is usually translated by a compiler
program into object code, which is generally only readable by the computer.
Object code is considered to be low-level language, and it is comprised of a
sequence of binary ones and zeros that is unintelligible to humans. Object code
"flips switches" on and off within the computer.15 It is the object code which is
purchased and run in a typical computer program; usually source code is not
publicly sold or distributed. It should be noted that translating from object code
to source code is very difficult, even with the assistance of a decompiler; it is
easier to rewrite a program than it is to translate object code back into source
code.16
III. METHODS OF PROTECTING SOFTWARE
There are three main categories of legal protection available for computer
software: patent, trade secret and copyright. Patents would seem appropriate
as a form of legal protection for computer software since they are designed to
protect inventive technical solutions, which is descriptive of computer
programs.17 Title 35 U.S.C. § 154, which provides for patent legal protection,
protects the functional aspects of an innovation-the inventive idea itself rather
than its manner of expression.18 Patent law, however, has historically protected
only tangible inventions.19
11id.
12See Edwin H. Taylor, Protection of Computer Software, 269 PLI/Pat 181, PLI Order
No. G4-3831, 182 (Apr. 1, 1989).
13See WHITE, supra note 10, at 44.
14 See MARGRETH BARRET-r, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 145 (1991).
151d.
16See Taylor, supra note 12, at 192.
17See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Model Provisions on the
Protection of Computer Software, Jan. 1978, at 8.
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1995) ("Every patent... grant[s] to the patentee... for the
term of twenty years from the date on which the application was filed in the United
States... the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention....").
1995]
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A. Patents
Patent protection of computer software has generally been deemed
insufficient for numerous reasons.20 First, it is very difficult to obtain relief in
litigation.21 Second, many types of programmable processes and programmed
machines may not ultimately be patentable subject matter.22 Further there are
commercial uncertainties arising from this fact, even should they eventually be
held patentable.23 Fourth, the most valuable programs will not qualify for
patents, even if the subject matter is patentable, since they will run afoul of the
novelty and non-obviousness requirements. 24 Even if a computer program can
be patented, this may be possible only if it is claimed in an awkward and
unnatural manner.
Additionally, obtaining a patent on a program is very expensive; it is
estimated that the expense associated with obtaining a software patent exceeds
$10,000.25 The above problems exist because a person seeking a patent must
first prepare a patent application that designates any claims to the scope of the
invention. Then, the application must be filed with the United States Patent
and Trademark Office [hereinafter PTO). The PTO must then examine the
application and conduct a search for any prior patents which may limit the
scope of the invention. The tremendous number of patents which have been
issued makes this process lengthy, and very costly.26
19 See Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1047.
20 See David Bender & Anthony R. Barkume, Patents for Software-Related Inventions, 5
SOFTWAREL.J. 279,280-83 (1992);seeHoward K. Szabo, Comment, Interna tionalProtection
of Computer Software: The Need for Sui Generis Legislation, 8 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ.
511, 526 (1986).
21 Bender & Barkume, supra note 20, at 280-83.
221d.
231d.
24 d. The P.T.O. examines each application to determine whether the claimed
invention is novel, non-obvious and useful. If it finds that the invention is, it issues a
patent. In determining novelty, the occurrence of certain events must be researched such
as the occurrence of a printed publication, the patenting of an invention, public
knowledge or use by others, upon which the claims read, prior to the applicant's having
invented the invention being claimed, then no valid patent may issue. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1995). The § 102 requirement for novelty is but a preliminary threshold to
overcome. Having done so does not mean that the applicant's claims are patentable
relative to the prior art. Thus, even though the applicant has established that his claimed
invention is novel (i.e., differs structurally and/or functionally from the prior art that is
the claims do not read literally on a single item of the prior art), 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1995)
superimposes the requirement that the claimed invention as a whole would also have
been nonobvious "at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1995). See generally,
IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACrICE 1 (5th ed. 1993).
25 Id.
26 See Szabo, supra note 20, at 526.
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Another pitfall is that patent protection may not suit an owner seeking to
maintain a competitive edge through secrecy because the patent itself contains
an elaborate description of the software and the manner and process of making
and using it. The description must be full, concise, and contain exact terms
which enables any person skilled in the art of computer software to duplicate
it.27 The patent becomes publicly available after issuance, and any secrecy
surrounding the disclosed invention is forfeited because a competitor can
examine the patented software and design around it28
Also problematic is that United States patent protection only begins on the
date a patent issues from the PTO. 29 A significant interval of time passes
between the filing of a patent application and the ultimate issue of the patent.
The average period of pendency between filing an application and issue of a
patent is eighteen months overall, and for software patents is at least two
years.30 Since most software generally has a short product life, the patent
becomes useless because the commercial lifetime of the software passes before
a patent would be issued.31 A final problem is that since the patent itself is a
public document, it is difficult to police unlawful use.32
The expense of a patent is just one of many hurdles-patent procurement is
doubtful in the majority of cases.33 Patents must be susceptible to industrial
application, in other words, must have some tangible character.34 Algorithms,
27 See 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1988).
28 See Edward M. Kalinka etal., Protecting Software in the Sale of Equipment From Reverse
Engineering, Business Problems & Planning, 69 MICH. B.J. 564,572 (1990).
29 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
30 See Bender & Barkume, supra note 20, at 281.
31[d.
32 See generally David Bender, Protecting Computer Trade Secrets, at 713, 723 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series 1986),
available in WESTLAw, 224 PLI/Pat 713.
33 The majority of patent applications do not result in issued patents. Obtaining a
patent is initiated by filing a patent application in the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). The application must comply with various statutory requirements and with rules
established by the PTO pursuant to the patent statute (35 U.S.C.). Subsequent to the
filing of the requisite application, it is studied and a search is conducted through all the
relevant prior United States patents by the examiners in the PTO and also through
patents of foreign countries and publications to find out if the invention is new and
nonobvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains (i.e.,
in the subject technology). A decision is then reached by the examiner (which is most
often negative) in light of the study and the results of the search, as to the patentability
of the invention as claimed and also as to various formal matters. See, IRVING KAYTON,
PATENT PRACrICE 1 (5th ed. 1993).
34 See Jean Jonqueres, The Patentability of Software, 18 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 607, 609 (1987) (stating that patent law generally protects objects which
are capable of being handled and operated; it does not protect ideas so the invention
must be in the form of a product and not of a concept); Dawn Jordan, Software Piracy:
19951
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unless tied to a physical process, are not protected.35 Software and algorithms
have not received the same level of protection that computer hardware has
because of their intangible characteristics. 36
The essence of software does not lie in a process, machine, manufactured
article, or composition of matter, but rather in its underlying algorithm. An
algorithm is a sequence of steps which, when followed, perform a useful and
intended result. An algorithm is meant to be implemented on high-speed
processors, but humans, in theory and given enough time, can also perform
the algorithm to yield the same result.37
The Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson,3 8 emphasizing that the algorithm
was not a tangible process, construed the patent law to exclude protection of
an algorithm that converted binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary
numbers.39 The Court also noted that mental steps are not patentable. 40 The
Court reasoned that the patenting of an algorithm would be the equivalent of
patenting mental steps, which would result in a patent being able to exclude
individuals from thinking in the manner of the patented algorithm. The Court
defined an algorithm as "[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical
problem."41
This definition of the term algorithm has resulted in much confusion because
it differs from the definition generally used in the computer industry. In the
computer industry the term "algorithm" generally means "a procedure
consisting of a sequence of logical operations which combine data,
mathematical principals and equipment for the purpose of interpreting and/or
acting upon certain data."42
It must be emphasized that when the Supreme Court in Benson used the term
"algorithm", it was referring to a procedure for solving a mathematical problem
The United States Needs to Utilize the Protection Provided by the Berne Convention in the
Pacific Rim, 3 EMORY J. INT'L DisP. REsOL. 135, 136 (1988).
3 5See Chisum, supra note 2, at 960-961 & 961 n. 3.
36 Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1049. It has
been noted that, "Patent law's tangibility requirement has its roots in the nineteenth
century." Id. at 1049 n.24 (citing Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481,
489 (1891) ("A conception of the mind is not an invention until represented in some
physical form ...."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101, note 38 (West 1984) (Physical Form As
Essential) (citing numerous cases that require tangibility for patentability)).
37 See Einschlag & Michaelson, supra note 5, at 404.
38409 U.S. 63 (1972).
39 See id. at 68 (stressing the abstract nature of this patent claim).
401d. at 67.
411d. at 65.
42 See Mary Brandt Jensen, Softright: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of Users' and
Producers' Rights in Computer Software, 44 LA. L. REV. 1413, 1436 (1984).
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and not a procedure for interpreting or acting on input data.43 Even though the
Court limited its holding to the particular facts presented in Benson,44 the Court
concluded that algorithms and software should be excluded from patent
protection under the current statute.45 This does not render all inventions that
involve a mathematical formula unpatentable.46 The holding simply means
that a process claim which contains a mathematical formula cannot be drawn
so broadly that it covers all uses, known and unknown, of the formula.47
The ruling in Benson, rendered algorithms unprotectable when taken by
themselves. 48 One commentator has noted that this has caused "entire fields of
algorithmic development [to] remain vulnerable to piracy, which may
discourage investment and work in the algorithmic field."49 As an example,
this commentator pointed to Professor Ronald Bracewell's work involving the
Fast Fourier Transform:
... Professor Ronald Bracewell50 developed an improvement to the
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), a highly sophisticated algorithm
fundamental to the field of signal processing and crucial to many
scientific applications. His improvement can provide as much as a
twofold increase in the sFeed of certain calculations, 'regardless of the
kind of computer used.'
Professor Bracewell was forced to prototype his algorithm within a silicon
microchip, a physical form, in order to satisfy the tangibility requirements of
the current patent law.52
431d.
4 4See Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1050 n.28
(but "Benson does not preclude the patentability of all abstract processes or software
programs").
45See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (stating that a grant of patent
protection to this claim would effectively extend patent protection to an algorithm,
which the Court viewed as tantamount to patenting an idea itself).
46See Jensen, supra note 42, at 1437 n.142; Benson, 409 U.S. at 65-67.
47 See Jensen, supra note 42, at 1455 n.143.
48 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 72.
49 Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1058; see also
Chisum, supra note 2, at 1020 ("Policy considerations indicate that patent protection is
as appropriate for mathematical algorithms that are useful in computer programming
as for other technological innovations.... The absence of a clear rule on the allowability
of patent claims to algorithms that comply with the rigorous standards of patentability
and other requirements for obtaining patent protection may cause reluctance on the part
of financial interests to back new ventures for the development of innovative software.
50 professor of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University.
51 Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1059.
52Id.
1995]
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The patent law's legal requirement of tangibility imposes unnecessary
transaction costs such as seeking a lab to prototype the algorithm in silicon,
and it increases product development costs. 53 In addition, the tangibility
requirement encourages attempts to "shoehorn claims" into a rigid physical
framework. 54 Professor Bracewell finally received a patent under the
description "Computer and Method for the Discrete Bracewell Transform."55
The professor was forced to add the words "computer and" in order to satisfy
the patent law's requirement of physicality.56
The gap between intellectual property law and the nature of modem
inventions, such as Professor Bracewell's transform, results in a tremendous
waste of resources. 57 The example of Professor Bracewell clearly illustrates the
misalignment that distorts all of computer law by the requirement of
physicality.58 "Rather than focusing on the essence of the innovation, the
[present patent] law draws an arbitrary distinction between the tangible and
the abstract."59 Current patent law promotes high transaction costs while
providing uncertain protection, and leaves "abstract innovations either
completely unprotected or distorted and 'shoehorned' into some tangible
expression."60
A formula in the abstract may not be patented; the application of a newly
discovered formula in a particular process, however may be patented if the
whole process is patentable.61 When a patent claim recites a formula, the claim
must be examined to determine whether it is seeking patent protection for the
formula in the abstract or for the whole structure or process applying the
formula.62 The examination ensures the patent laws function to protect only
53Id.
54 Id.; see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 451 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's holding that any permanent
physical occupation is a per se taking "encourages litigants to manipulate their factual
allegations to gain the benefit of its per se rule"); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,590 (1978)
(rejecting an attempt to shoehorn an otherwise unworthy patent claim into a physical
process in order to obtain protection).
5SComputer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1059;see 1075
OFFICIAL GAZETIE U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 2236 (1987) (Pat. No. 4,646,256) (issued
Feb. 24; 1987).
56 Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1059.
571d. at 1060.
58Id.
591d.
60 Id.
6 1See Jensen, supra note 42, at 1437 n.145.
621d. at 1437 n.146.
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the whole structure or process applying the formula.63 Such a patent claim and
the inquiry it involves were presented in Diamond v. Diehr.64 The Diamond Court
held that patent laws could afford protection to software that is linked to a
physical process.65 The patent application claim satisfies the requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 101 when the computer software is linked to a structure or process
applying the algorithms, which when considered as a whole, perform a
function that the patent laws were intended to protect.66
In 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Arrhythmia
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,6 7 employing the aforementioned
Diehr test (which is really a modified Freeman-Walter-Abele test),68 affirmed a
631d.
64450 U.S. 175 (1981). Diehr applied for a patent on a process for molding rubber
which ensured that the rubber would always be perfectly cured. Id. at 177. A computer
operated by a program took constant measurements of the temperature of the mold and
constantly recalculated the remaining cure time, by applying a known formula, taking
into account changes in room temperature during the elapsed cure time. Id. at 177-78.
When the computer determined that the remaining cure time was exactly zero, it
automatically opened the mold. Id. Diehr did not attempt to claim patent protection for
the formula itself; he claimed only the improved process for curing rubber. Id. at 187.
Since Diehr only attempted to patent a total process and not the formula itself or a
method of calculation, the Court held that the presence of the formula and the computer
solution of it did not destroy the statutory subject matter of the process as a whole. Id.
65450 U.S. at 187. The Court explained that patentability will depend on whether the
subject matter is a mathematical formula or an industrial process. Id.
66 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. Since Diehr, the lower courts have followed a two-step
analysis in deciding whether patent claims for computer related inventions, which are
usually predicated upon an assertion that the application of a formula is part of a
particular process, involve one of the categories of statutory subject matter or one of the
exclusions to those categories. This analysis was originally set forth in In re Walter, 618
F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980), and In reAbele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982), and was approved
by the Supreme Court in Diehr. The claim is first analyzed to determine whether a
mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. SeeJensen, supra note 42, at 1440.
Next, if a mathematical algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to
determine whether the algorithm is "applied in any manner to physical elements or
process steps," and, if it is, it "passes muster under 35 U.S.C. § 101." Id.
67958 F.2d 1053, 1058-1060 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
68 The test poses two inquiries. First, does the patent claim recite, directly or
indirectly, a mathematical algorithm, formula or "mental step"? If not, then the claim is
for statutory subject matter, if so, the second inquiry must be reached. Second, does the
claim involve application of the algorithm, etc. to specific physical elements or processes
(something more than a field-of-use limitation or the addition of "non-essential
post-solution activity?). If so, the claim is for statutory subject matter; if not, the claim
is not for statutory subject matter.
The second step's content has expanded and contracted over time. In In re Freeman,
573 F.2d 1237,197 U.S.P.Q. 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978), the CCPA framed it in terms of algorithm
"preemption": i.e., "the claim must be... analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it
wholly "preempts." In In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 USPQ 397 (CCPA 1980), the court
reframed it as follows:
19951
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district court determination of patent infringement and validity on a patented
apparatus and process for human heart electrocardiographic signal analysis.69
The Federal Circuit upheld patentability, even though the claims included a
mathematical algorithm, "because the output of the system was 'not an abstract
number but [was] a signal related to the patient's heart activitry.'" 70 The
Arrhythmia case suggests that as long as a "computer program produces
external output, rather than just performing endless internal calculations
without practical output, the test for patentability is satisfied."71 However, very
few computer programs would fail the Arrhythmia test.72 As a result, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office has been flooded with an onslaught of patent
applications drafted accordingly with the Federal Circuit's open-handed
approach.73 The software must now be disguised under the pretext of a process
in order to obtain patentability. One clearly foreseeable problem is that many
broad process claims that have become patentable also cover underlying
software.74 The PTO will be unduly burdened with construing manufacturing
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a whole
... must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical
algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural
relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus
claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process claims), the claim
being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101. If,
however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented and solved
by the claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and Flook, and is not
applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, no amount
of post-solution activity will render the claim statutory; nor is it saved
by a preamble merely reciting the field of use of the mathematical algo-
rithm.
Various indicia are helpful in determining whether a claim as a whole
calls merely for the solution of a mathematical algorithm. For instance, if
the end product of a claimed invention is a pure number, as in Benson and
Flook, the invention is nonstatutory regardless of any post-solution activity
which makes it available for use by a person or machine for other pur-
poses. If, however, the claimed invention produces a physical thing, such
as the noiseless seismic trace in In re Johnson, [589 F.2d 1070, 200 USPQ 199
(CCPA 1978)] the fact that it is represented in numerical form does not render
the claim nonstatutory.
69 See Roger L. Cook, The Software Industry Anticipates a Flood of Patent Litigation, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at 52.
70 d. (quoting Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d 1053, 1058-60 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
71Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 For example, as explained by Roger Cook:
[A] typical patent on a software program for controlling a manufacturing
process might read as follows:
A process for controlling the implementation of engineering changes in
a semiconductor manufacturing process comprising:
[Vol. 43:19
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processes as prior art for software patent applications. Many critics believe that
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office does not do a good job of examining
software patents.75 According to this view, the Patent and Trademark Office's
prior art library does not include an adequate amount of software prior art.76
Software described in a patent specification, can be examined by anyone
because algorithms cannot be patented by themselves. 77 Hence, anyone could
determine the algorithm employed by a particular software and use the
algorithm itself free of any fear of infringing the patent.7 8 However, the
algorithm can not be used in a process or in an apparatus which, when taken
as a whole with the algorithm, would infringe any claim in the patent.79
Obtaining patent protection for an apparatus or a process with a software
implemented algorithm does not deter would be infringers. Patentees have the
burden of detecting infringement on their patent. Even when infringement is
suspected by a patent owner, license negotiations between the patent owner
and the suspected infringer frequently take several years.80 Oftentimes, the
detecting at a manufacturing station a defect in a part being manufactured,
the design of said part being stored in computer memory at a remote location;
communicating said defect to said remote location for correction;
correcting the cause of the defect of said part, said correction being made
and stored in computer memory;
communicating the correction of said defect to the manufacturing station;
and implementing said correction at the manufacturing station.
Cook, supra note 69, at 52. The word 'software' does not appear anywhere in the claim,
however, this claim would cover a computer software-controlled process for
implementing corresponding defects in a semiconductor manufacturing process. Id.
75Any person or entity charged with patent infringement can challenge the validity
of the patent in federal court. One of the factors that justifies this rule is the
acknowledged inability of the PTO to discover all of the relevant prior art during the
patent application process. Id.
76 d. Professor Paul Goldstein, a professor of intellectual property law at Stanford
University's law school, has stated that many of those concerned about Compton's
broad-based patent complain that the Patent Office may have been unable to research
the sources of the technology which underlie the invention. Victoria Slind-Flor,
Rethinking Protection, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 24 at sl, s26. According to Professor Goldstein, "It
reflects the inefficacy of the patent office in dealing with software-the lack of a prior
art data base to measure software-related inventions against." Id.
771d.
78 Id.
79 See Einschlag & Michaelson, supra note 5, at 405.
80 See Cook, supra note 69, at s3, s4. As Cook explained:
A patent does not give its owner the right to practice the patented in-
vention, only the right to prevent others from practicing it. Companies
with patented technology often discover that others-sometimes
numerous others-hold blocking patents that make it impossible or
impracticable for the company to use its own inventions....
The small company that wishes to keep its patented software to
itself, and not license it to anyone-let alone to one of the major players
in the industry-is going to be under terrific pressure to succumb to the
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infringer reaps a tremendous windfall from the license negotiations since he is
usually not required to pay patent royalties on infringing activities that
occurred prior to the time in which the license agreement takes effect.81
If licensing negotiations fail, litigation is another option for the patent owner
to pursue. However, patent litigation can be very complex and may stretch over
many years (seven years is a common time-frame in the United States for patent
litigation).82 During litigation, the patentee runs the risk of losing if a court
holds his patent invalid. If the patent is found to be valid and infringed, patent
remedies include injunctions83 and substantial financial recovery (such as
monetary damages, court costs; and if willful infringement is found, the
possibility of treble damages and attorneys fees).84 Nonetheless, the remedies
afforded the patent owner may be of little consolation in light of the uncertain
outcome of complex and time consuming litigation. Consequently, the vast
majority of patent cases are settled with the infringer, leaving the negotiation
table, paying far less than he would have if found liable of infringement.85
B. Copyrights
Presently, copyright statutes are the predominant avenue86 used to protect
intellectual property rights in computer software.87 In the Copyright Act of
1976, Congress clearly expressed its intent that computer programs be
considered works of authorship, 8 and recent cases confirm the
copyrightability of computer programs.89 A computer program is considered
a literary work of authorship 9O to which copyright protection attaches. 91
cross-license demand. Judging from past events, most if not all significant
patents in the software industry likely are to be cross-licensed eventually.
Cook, supra note 69, at 53-54.
81 id.
82 See Einschlag & Michaelson, supra note 5, at 406.
83See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
84 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 285 (1988).
85 See Einschlag & Michaelson, supra note 5, at 406.
86 See Phillips, supra note 4, at 998; see also David R. Ellis, Computer Law--A Primer on
the Law of Software Protection, 60 FLA. B.J. 81, April 1986 (stating that, "Perhaps the most
important method of protecting computer software is through the law of copyrights..
8717 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
8817 U.S.C. § 117 (1988); H.R. Rep. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
89 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)
(ruling that programs in both source code and object code were protected by copyright
and rejecting the argument that object code should not be protected because it only
communicates to a machine and is not readable by humans); Williams Elecs., Inc. v.
Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers,
Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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Section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines the subject matter of copyright.
Subsection (a) provides that copyright subsists "in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."92
A work of authorship must be "original" in order to qualify for copyright
protection. The originality requirement has two facets: first, the author must
have engaged in some intellectual endeavor and not just copied from a
pre-existing source; second, the author must have expressed a minimal amount
of creativity. Thus, the author must contribute more than just a trivial variation
from a previous work. For example, copyright protection does not cover
language that is cliched, that expresses an idea in a more or less stereotypical
manner, or scenes a faire ("stock" scenes that are standard or necessary in
treating a given topic).93
The basic purpose of copyright law is to protect the expression of an idea,
but not the underlying idea itself.94 Copyright does not protect actual ideas,
processes, procedures, methods of operation, systems, concepts, discoveries,
90See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
9117 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
92See Barrett, supra note 14, at 138.
According to the House Committee Report No. 1476,94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5659, 5667 respecting the Copyright Act, literary works include 'computer
programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the program-
mer's expression of original ideas ... Any doubts as to whether computer
programs could be subject of copyright were dispelled by the passage
of the Computer Copyright Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,§ 10, 94 Stat. 3015,3028 (1980). The effect of this brief amendment, accord-
ing to the House Report, was to 'clearly [apply] the 1976 law to computer
programs... H.R. Rep. No. 1307,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6492, 6509. The Computer Copy-
right Act defined computer programs as 'a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result.
Gerald Sobel & David Einhom, Software Protection and Licensing, at 369,373 nn. 5-8, (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No.
G4-3825, 1989), available in WESTLAW, 265 PLI/Pat 369.
931d.
94 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-106 (1879) (holding that the author of a
copyrighted book describing a new bookkeeping method was notprotected from others
using the method; rather, the author was only protected from others reproducing his
expression of the bookkeeping ideas).
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principles, or utilitarian aspects of a work.95 While copyright law protects
many different expressions of an invention, it does not protect the underlying
functionality that usually constitutes the true innovation. 96 Hence, copyright
law extends protection to the software code itself from direct plagiarism, but it
does not extend protection to the ideas behind the software.97 This allows
competitors to legally duplicate underlying ideas so long as they do not imitate
the expression of those ideas.98
"The utilitarian aspect of object code was at one time suggested as a reason
for not extending copyright protection to object code, but this reasoning was
ultimately rejected." 99 Proposed statutes would extend copyright-like
protection to the functional aspects of software and algorithms.100
Congressional action could provide additional levels of protection to
encourage innovation in these critical technological areas. In fact, the Supreme
Court has consistently urged congressional action in this field.101 "Congress'
9517 U.S.C. § 102(b); see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466,480 (D.
Neb. 1981).
96 See Richard H. Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1229,1236 (1986). Stern states, "Original thinkers cannot copyright their ideas since
copyright protects only the 'expressions' of ideas." Id.
97 See Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1051.
981d.
99 Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., No. 81-1295, 1983
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 25,529 (D. Idaho 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (appellate decision impliedly rejected lower court
holding); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
affd & remanded on other grounds, 629 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
A work has utilitarian aspects when it serves some function
other than communication of expressions of ideas to human beings.
A computer program can have both a utilitarian function and a
communication function. The source code can cause a computer to
perform a task. The object code can only perform the utilitarian
function; it cannot communicate to human beings without the aid
of some device which converts magnetic or electrical impulses into
symbols. Thus, it was argued that copyright protection should not
extend to object code. However, programmers often register their
object code for copyright protection while keeping their source
code secret; they are afraid that full copyright protection will not
be extended to object code and that trade secret protection for the
source code will be needed as a backup for insufficient copyright
protection.
Jensen, supra note 42, at n.17.
100 see Stem, supra note 96, at 1239-41.
101See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972). "The technological problems
tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by Congress
is needed." Id.
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failure to act, however, has left the functional aspects of software and
algorithms unprotected."'10 2
Copyright law presently affords computer software the same protection as
works of a creative nature such as books, plays, and musical recordings. 03
However, most consumers clearly "purchase software for its utilitarian value
in accomplishing certain functions" as opposed to its artistic or expressive
value.104 Functionality and ease of use are far more important to a purchaser
of software than its aesthetic appeal or originality.105
Software producers spend considerable time, energy and resources
developing marketable software products. They must rely on a steady stream
of sales over the lifetime of the product in order to recoup their expenses and
realize a profit.106 Under the current copyright laws, however, competitors may
copy the underlying idea of the software, and express it in their own fashion
at a much lower end cost since they avoided the expensive developmental
expenditures. Consumers are more likely to buy the cheaper copy, which
would provide the same use, or perhaps, improved functionality over the
original product.107
"In contrast, many copyrightable works [(other than software)] are
purchased for originality or aesthetic" value.108 Consumers of such works are
willing to pay premium rates for original artistic ideas. "[Cireative works have
102 See Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1052.
103 See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 1992 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,931,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1992). The Altai court stated,
The Copyright Act affords protection to "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. Section 102(a).
This broad category of protected "works" includes "literary works," id.,
which are defined by the act as works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books,
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film tapes, disks, or cards, in
which they are embodied. 17 U.S.C. Section 101. While computer pro-
grams are not specifically listed as part of the above statutory defini-
tion, the legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended them
to be considered literary works. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667; Whelan, 797 F.2d at
1234; Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1247).
Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1249.
104Phillips, supra note 4, at 1009.
105 See id. at 1009. "Diversity is the primary goal when it comes to novels, songs, and
other traditional domains of copyright. Readers want to read novels they have not read.
But diversity is not the goal of interface design. Computer users want consistency in
interfaces because this promotes ease of use." Richard Stallman & Simon Garfinkel,
Against User Interface Copyright, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Nov. 1990, at 16.
106 Phillips, supra note 4, at 1009.
107Id. at 1010.
108Id.
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a natural disincentive for copying-if consumers feel that a particular
expression is [overly] derivative of past works, they are not likely to be attracted
to it."109 However, software that incorporates an excessive number of new
commands and concepts may provide a disincentive to purchase because of
the new learning curve that a consumer must undertake in order to master the
new features. Thus, a new software product that possesses the same features
and characteristics of an older product, already known to consumers, reduces
the learning curve barrier. This feature along with a lower price or
improvements makes the product very desirable to software consumers. "[Tlhe
utilitarian nature of software requires a different type of protection than that
afforded by the copyright law to creative-type expressions." 110
Software architecture has been best described "as the overall structure and
organization of the program" because the "architecture sets forth the
operations, algorithms, routines and data structures, and establishes the logical
relationships between them" that are necessary to effectuate the desired goal
of the program.111 The federal courts have yet to achieve consistent treatment
of copyright protection for software architecture. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,112 the Third Circuit's extension of copyright protection
for computer software113 dramatically changes copyright law, "partciularly
with regard to the fundamental idea/expression dichotomy."11 4
1 09 1d.
110d.
1 11See Marc T. Kretschmer, Note, Copyright Protectionfor Software Architecture: Just Say
No!, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 823,825; see also Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and
Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1493, 1524-44 (1987).
112797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
113 Whelan gave developers a substantial boost in their efforts to employ copyright law
to protectprogram architecture. TheThird Circuit held that one program infringed upon
another solely because of similarities in structure. Id. Whelan Associates had written a
program marketed as "Dentalab" for the IBM Series One computer. Id. at 1225. The
program was billed as designed to meet the business needs of dental laboratories. Id.
The program was developed through consultation with Jaslow Dental labs, which had
helped identify these business needs. Id. Whelan Associates and Jaslow Labs entered
into an agreement a year after the program became operational under which Jaslow
Labs agreed to market the program. 797 F.2d at 1225. The president of Jaslow Labs
developed a dental lab program in a language compatible with personal computers after
discovering that many of the smaller dental labs employed personal computers on
which Dentalab could not be used. Id. This software was marketed as "Dentcom PC."
Id.
Whelan Associates immediately sued Jaslow Labs for infringing on their Dentalab
copyright. Id. at 1227. At trial an expert witness testified that "substantive differences in
programming style, in programming structure, in algorithms and data structure, all
indicate that the Dentcom system is not directly derived from" Dentalab. Id. at 1228. The
same expert witness' written report concluded, however, that the Dentalab and
Dentcom PC programs shared "overall structural similarities." 797 F.2d at 1228. The
district court relied on this finding in holding that the Dentcom system was substantially
similar to Dentalab. Id. The district court held that Jaslow, misusing its access to the
[Vol. 43:19
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Programmers seek to minimize the number of operations necessary to avoid
exceeding memory restraints. Accomplishing the objective of achieving an
optimal architecture for functions and data requires great ingenuity and
considerable trial and error. This portion of the programming stage requires
considerable time and investment so the true value of the program rests not in
the actual code, but in the program's architecture. 115
There has been widespread dissatisfaction with the Whelan court's
formulation of the idea/expression dichotomy.116 The Whelan court's extension
of copyright protection to software seriously distorts copyright law, especially
with respect to the fundamental idea/expression dichotomy. Under Whelan,
original program, had copied Dentcom PC from Dentalab, thereby infringing on
Whelan Associates' copyright. Id.
114See Kretschmer, supra note 111, at 823. One commentator has said,
The idea/expression dichotomy is a doctrine that provides that only
the expression of an idea may be subject to copyright, not the idea
itself. Merger of idea and expression may be established by showing
that there are only a limited number of ways in which the idea may
be expressed. Where the "underlying ideas are capable of only a limited
range of expression, they 'may be protected only against virtually
identical copying."' When the idea and its expression merge, becoming
inseparable, copying the expression is not considered infringement
since "protecting the 'expression' would confer a monopoly of the
'idea.'" Where merger exists, a finding of substantial similarity will be
precluded.
Alisa E. Anderson, The Future of Software Copyright Protection: Arbitration v. Utigation, 12
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (1989).
115See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE LJ. 663, 688. Samuelson states,
"On complex assignments, a programmer may produce, on an average, only a few
words of code a day." Id. Most of the program development time is used to find creative
solutions that maximize the speed of the program and minimize the size of the program.
See generally Kretschmer, supra note 111, at 826 n.6.
116Kretschmer explains,
Four basic and often interrelated criticisms have emerged. They are:(1) the Whelan formulation of the idea is conceptually overbroad and
thereby misses the significance of the idea/expression dichotomy; (2) the
Whelan approach fails to recognize that different ideas may underlie
the different levels of the program; (3) the Whelan approach ignores the
influence of market factors in determining structure and potentially grants
the first developer of a program a monopoly over software in the field;
and (4) any decisions about copyright infringement of software archi-
tecture based on the idea/expression dichotomy will inevitably be arbi-
trary, and so will provide little guidance to software developers and other
courts. These substantial criticisms suggest that the idea/expression
distinction should be altogether abandoned in favor of the conceptually
neater and practically simpler utilitarian/aesthetic distinction employed
by the court in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,
462 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D.Tex. 1978) (the district court refused to
extend copyright protection to the structural elements of software).
Kretschmer, supra note 111, at 839.
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trial courts will be required to analyze software infringement cases using
copyright law; this will require a case by case analysis due to the technological
complexity of software infringement cases. 117 Idea and expression are not
distinct cognitive entities. Idea and expression represent opposite ends of the
cognitive continuum; in the middle of that continuum, idea and expression
become indistinguishable. 118
The Second Circuit declined to follow Whelan in Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc..119 Instead the court employed a three-step
procedure, based on the abstractions test120 utilized by the district court, to
1 171d. at 823. One commentator has noted,
[Aidvances in computer and software technology are eclipsing the
industry's capability to bring items to market in a commercially usable
form. Because the technological lifetime of a typical software product is
only two to three years, it is highly unlikely that the slower-evolving
judge-made law would be able to keep pace with these advances. For
example, recent advances in artificial intelligence technology will obfus-
cate the difference between a program and the data on which it operates.
These advances, and others yet unforeseen, will blur the distinction
between idea and expression further to a point in which it may no longer
have any useful meaning. Already, the idea-expression dichotomy
used to determine the protectable aspects of a copyrighted work
may yield completely arbitrary results when applied to computer programs.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 1026 (citations omitted).
118Kretschmer, supra note 111, at 839 n.71. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), Judge Learned Hand presented an abstraction test as the
inspiration for the idea/expression continuum. Judge Hand's crucial observation was:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
Id. at 121.
11923 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1992).
1201d. at 1252. The Altai court explained,
As applied to computer programs, the abstractions test will
comprise the first step in the examination for substantial similarity.
Initially, in a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a theore-
tical plane, a court should dissect the allegedly copied program's
structure and isolate each level of abstraction contained within it.
This process begins with the code and ends with an articulation of
the program's ultimate function. Along the way, it is necessary essen-
tially to retrace and map each of the designer's steps-in the opposite
order in which they were taken during the program's creation.
As an anatomical guide to this procedure, the following description
is helpful: At the lowest level of abstraction, a computer program may
be thought of in its entirety as a set of individual instructions organ-
ized into a hierarchy of modules. At a higher level of abstraction, the
instructions in the lowest-level modules may be replaced conceptually
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determine whether the non-literal elements of the computer programs were
substantially similar. The court equated computer program design efficiency
with deriving the most concise logical proof or formulating the most succinct
mathematical computation. The more efficient a set of modules are, the more
closely they approximate the idea or process embodied in that particular aspect
of the program's structure. 121 The abstraction test systematically eliminates
from copyright protection the efficient aspects of a computer program. What
remains after the analysis is what should be protectable.
The Altai court basically adopted a test which rewards inefficient
programmers over efficient ones. Competent programmers developing
efficient programs are not protected under Altai, while less competent
programmers drafting inefficient programs are protected. Certainly Congress
did not intend to reward inefficient computer programs with copyright
protection over efficient programs. The results of Altai exemplify how
inappropriate copyright registration is for computer programs. The court in
Altai acknowledged, "[W]e think that copyright registration-with its
indiscriminating availability-is not ideally suited to deal with the highly
dynamic technology of computer science."122 Software architecture deserves
protection; copyright, however, is not the proper method for providing that
protection. Trade secret protection is a more amenable method of protecting
software architecture.
by the functions of those modules. At progressively higher levels of
abstraction, the functions of higher-level modules conceptually replace
implementations of those modules in terms of lower-level modules and
instructions, until finally one is left with nothing but the ultimate func-
tion of the program .... A program has structure at every level of
abstraction at which it is viewed. At low levels of abstraction, a program's
structure may be quite complex; at the highest level it is trivial....
Once the program's abstraction levels have been discovered, the
substantial similarity inquiry moves from the conceptual to the concrete.
Professor Nimmer suggests, and we endorse, a "successive filtering
method" for separating protectable expression from non-protectable
material. See generally 3 Nimmer § 13.03[F]. This process entails exam-
ining the structural components at each level of abstraction to determine
whether their particular inclusion at that level was "idea" or was dictated
by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that
idea; required by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the
public domain and hence is non-protectable expression.... The structure
of any given program may reflect some, all, or none of these considerations.
Each case requires its own specific investigation.
Id. at 1253 (citations omitted).
121/d.
122/d.
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C. Trade Secrets
Trade secrets 123 are a nonstatutory area of law that can be employed to offer
protection against theft of computer programs. 124 "A trade secret is a formula,
pattern, device or information which is used in the operation of a business and
provides that business with an advantage or an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over those who do not know or use it."125 In order to remain a secret,
the owner of the trade secret must take precautions so the trade secret does not
become accessible to individuals other than those expressly selected by the
owner to be privy to it.126
The primary problem with trade secret protection is that the only feasible
method to maintain a marketed program as a secret is to impose a contractual
obligation of confidentiality on the purchaser. However, if the purchaser
divulges the trade secret to a third party, the vendor will have no cause of action
against that third party. Moreover, vendors are reluctant to sue their customers,
which gives rise to the anomaly inherent in trade secret protection-that a
vendor cannot sue its customers or third parties. 127
IV. INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE VARIOUS FoRMs OF PROTECTION
The current intellectual property regime in the United States limits the owner
of software to one type of protection at a time. Invoking one type of intellectual
property protection often precludes a software owner from using concurrent
methods of protection. Copyright does not entirely preempt state trade secret.
Registration, however, can destroy the secrecy required for trade secret
protection since registered works are deposited with the Copyright Office and
the Library of Congress, and are available for public inspection. 128 As one
123 See 1939 Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b.
124 See Edwin H. Taylor, Protection of Computer Software, at 181, 188 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3831,
1989), available in WESTLAW, 269 PLI/Pat 181. (Computer software including both object
code and source code clearly qualifies as subject matter protectable by trade secret law,
both under the traditional definition set forth in the Restatement and the definition in
the Uniform Trade Secret Act. Obviously, a key requirement is that of secrecy and this
is discussed later. Constant care must be taken to keep software secret); see, e.g., Belth
v. Insurance Dep't, 406 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1977). State laws on trade secrecy have
consistently been upheld to apply to computer software.
12 5See Ellis, supra note 86, at 82.
1261d.
127See Dawn Jordan, Software Piracy: The United States Needs to Utilize the Protection
Provided by the Berne Convention in the Pacific Rim, 3 EMORY J. INT'L DIsp. RESOL. 135, 137
(1988). The California Court of Appeals recently discarded trade secret law as effective
protection for a seller's rights in software sold to the public.
128Jensen stated,
... Office regulation which allows an exemption from the Library of
Congress deposit requirement for a computer program when the
program is published only in machine readable form and when
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commentator notes, "It is impossible to retain trade secret protection for
property that is the subject of a patent. The secrecy requirements of trade secret
are diametrically opposed to the disclosure requirements for patent
protection. 129 In addition, the uncertainty associated with acquiring patent
protection for computer software can leave a developer of software without
either a patent or a trade secret after undergoing a long and expensive patent
application process in which some or all of the secrets that were disclosed in
the patent application become part of the public record through the opinions
published by the courts when the denial of the application is appealed.130
Copyright does not protect the ideas, algorithms and logic underlying
software programs. Patent protection is very expensive and often difficult to
obtain. Trade secret protection requires the owner to monitor the use of the
program by licensees to make sure they are not misusing or disclosing the
secret, which is a near impossible task when software is mass-licensed to
hundreds or thousands of users. Additionally, the uncertain effects of copyright
law on trade secret protection and the lack of adequate means to protect secrecy
in the registration process compel developers to either weaken their copyright
protection by refusing to register at all or by registering only the object code
under the "rule of doubt," or to further weaken their trade secret protection by
depositing source code information with the Copyright Office. Ironically, the
uncertainty of obtaining patent protection and the risk of disclosure though
appeals (even where protection is ultimately denied) force developers to risk
loss of trade secret protection in order to pursue the mere possibility of patent
protection. In summary, none of the methods on their own provide sufficient
protection, and the protection schemes are incompatible for providing
concurrent protection. 131
identifying materials are submitted to the Copyright Office in lieu
of the entire source code. The identifying materials which must
be submitted consist of the first and last twenty-five pages of the
source code and the page containing the copyright notices. The code
can sometimes be arranged so that the first and last twenty-five pages
contain only nonsecret information which will not destroy the secrecy
of the trade secret, but in the case of short programs, even the identify-
ing materials requirement may require the deposit of all or substan-
tially all of the source code .... In summary, the only sure registration
of a computer program is the submission of at least the first and last
twenty-five pages of the source code, which is likely to disclose enough
of the program to destroy the secrecy required for trade secret protection.
Jensen, supra note 42, at 1446.
1291d. at 1446.
1301d. When a patent application is denied, the applicant is caught in a Catch-22
situation-he must either forgo his/her right to an appeal and give up all hope of ever
obtaining a patent, or take his appeal and hope that his secrets will not be disclosed in
an opinion or that he will be able to seal the record before the opinion is released.
131 d. at 1433.
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V. CONCLUSION
A new form of intellectual property protection "sui generis" is needed to
balance the interests of software developers with those of society.132 The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984133 was enacted to provide sui
generis protection for micro chip mask works in order to curtail rampant
pirating. Such protection is necessitated by the extraordinary amounts of
self-help that developers must pursue because of the lack of protection and
policing mechanisms under the current intellectual property regime.134
Our nation's economic viability is dependent on advances in technology.
Advancement in the computer software industry is seriously hampered by the
inability of our intellectual property laws to adequately protect software
innovations. Congress has left the software industry in a quagmire by
manipulating the traditional forms of intellectual property protection to cover
software. New technologies do not fit neatly into the existing intellectual
property framework.135 Due to the importance of the computer software
industry, it is reasonable to provide independent treatment to such technology.
Endless issues must be addressed by Congress in providing adequate
protection for computer software. Some items that should be considered are:
(1) submitting, during filing, a complete copy of the source code to be protected;
(2) shortening the scope of protection to one or two years; (3) increasing the
number of examiners in the software area in order to reduce prosecution time;
(4) imposing stricter penalties for computer software piracy and infringement;
and, (5) granting monopolies on complex algorithms, such as Professor
Bracewell's Fast Fourier Transform, with exemptions for human thought
processes and academic research.136
A new method of protection must be instituted in order to provide incentive
to software developers to invest time, money and resources on software
13 2See Willis E. Higgins, Technological Poetry: The Interface Between Copyright and Patents
for Software, 12 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 67, 77 (1989); see, e.g., Peter S. Menell,
Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1365, 1371 (1987).
13 3 Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, § 302, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 901-14).
13 4See James A. Eidelman & Carol R. Shepherd, Living Among Pirates: Practical
Strategies to Protect Computer Software, MICH. B.J. (Mar. 1986). Many developers are
employing means such as: (1) physical copy protection-to prevent a program disk from
being copied using the computer's normal copy procedures; (2) embedding the end
user's name in the program so that it will be displayed on the screen, reminding him/her
of the personal nature of the license; (3) embedding each distributed program copy with
its own serial number. By requiring the return of a signed agreement with the serial
number as a condition to providing valuable product assistance and support, the client
discourages theft and may trace illegal copies to users responsible for piracy; (4) shrink
wrap license agreements.
135 See Phillips, supra note 4, at 1036-37.
136 See id. at 1038-42 (listing more items that should be addressed in sui generis
legislation).
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innovation. We are entering a global economy; our country cannot afford to
handicap its software industry by employing archaic laws that are ill-equipped
to handle such high technology as computer software.
HIMANSHU S. AMIN
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